Despite the international reach, and increasing global importance, of the free market provision of military and security services -which we label the Private Security Industry -management and organisation studies has yet to pay significant attention to this industry. Taking up Grey's (2009) call for scholarship at the boundaries between security studies and organisation studies and building on Banerjee's (2008) treatment of the PSI as a key element in necrocapitalism, in this paper we aim to trace the long history of the PSI and argue that it has re-emerged over the last two decades against, and as a result of, a very specific politico-economic backdrop. We then suggest that the PSI operates as a mechanism for neoliberal imperialism; demonstrate its substitution for and supplementing of the state; and count some of the costs of this privatisation of war.
Introduction
The last twenty years or so have seen the rise, or more correctly the re-emergence, of privately owned and operated military and security organisations. Such organisations have historically had a significant effect on shaping the political and economic world order and, in the context of contemporary global capitalism, this role is seemingly being reprised. Since 1990, the Private Security Industry (PSI) has witnessed a decade on decade market growth rate of 100% (Leander, 2005) . When such growth is compared to other global industries such as energy, where primary energy consumption rose 'by 2.5% in 2011, roughly in line with the 10-year average' (BP, 2012: 2) , its vitality appears astonishing. During 2010 alone, the PSI's British arm won a record £29 million in government contracts covering operations in Afghanistan alone (Townsend, 2011) .
By 2015, one estimate suggests its broader global value will reach $230 billion (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011 (Spearin, 2001; Avant, 2004) .
It is worth noting that ascribing the labels PSI and PSC to the private security industry is a relatively recent development and, in itself, an indicator of the quickly evolving structure of this industry. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the preferred terms were Private Military Industry and Private Military Companies (Singer, 2004) : a reflection of the activities of the most prominent organisations of that time. These companies, such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, engaged primarily in military -or what we might call 'offensive' -activity. However, more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, private firms have been hired primarily to undertake roles such as guarding bases, commercial enterprises and government installations; providing escort services for civilian convoys; or close protection and bodyguarding services for individuals. The emerging emphasis on these 'defensive' or 'precautionary' activities has led to a relabelling of the industry as more focused on security than on military engagement.
Whilst the PSI has been discussed in disciplines such as politics and international relations, law and legal studies, history, and military and peace studies, and despite its economic significance and the obvious prominence of the clients of PSCs, scholars of management and organisation have largely neglected it. This paper is therefore a response to Grey's (2009) call for greater interdisciplinarity between organisation studies and security studies. We also build upon Banerjee's (2008) In a more narrow sense, our central task is to explore the implications of the changing relationship between public and private organisations over the control and conduct of military and security activity.
To fulfil these objectives, we do the following: i) establish the long history of the PSI and, in particular, establish the key points at which its services were gradually taken over by standing state militaries; ii) identify two intersecting conditions (privatisation and the end of the Cold War) as facilitating the PSI's re-emergence within the wider context of political and economic neoliberalisation; iii) analyse the PSI as a tool of neoliberal imperialism and isolate the ways in which it both substitutes for and supplements the state; iv) address the implications of this substitution and supplementation by counting some of the costs of privatising war; and, finally, v) speculate as to the possible beneficiaries of exponential PSI growth by considering the emergence of what Hughes (2007) calls the new security-industrial complex. River to Alexander the Great; and it was the Vandal, Goth and Visigoth hordes -whom it had previously trained and paid -that eventually helped bring down the Roman Empire between late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages (Armstrong, 2008) .
Throughout the era of feudalism local lords or, at state level, monarchs, continued to rely heavily on privately recruited military forces (Fawtier, 1966) . By the fourteenth 6 century it was the Italian city states of Florence, Genoa and Venice that had developed an especially substantive reliance on such forces. These city states often lacked the population required to raise armies but did have substantial wealth in currency form through their lucrative Mediterranean trading links. Local guilds raised forces under a system of condotta, or contracts (Keirnan, 1957) . The use of such forces was underpinned by a belief, which we might associate more readily with post-Industrial
Revolution management discourse, that this was a highly rational and efficient means of defence (Singer, 2004 (Mears, 1988) . In order to consolidate power and territory, new ruling elites sought to establish a military apparatus recruited, trained and controlled by the state (albeit periodically and rarely as a standing army). This was the genesis of the 7 nationalisation of military activity which gradually transmogrified into the state standing army organisational form with which we are more familiar today. Changes in warcraft, principally the development of the cannon and the subsequent diminution of the importance of cavalry and castle fortifications, further served to render the centralised state the most efficient unit of organisation for the military (Bean, 1973) .
This is not to suggest that privately contracted forces ceased to be employed by nation states, but rather that they were frequently subsumed within, or largely replaced by, state militaries (Krishnan, 2008) .
Of course, the move towards nation states mobilising standing citizen armies was not achieved all at once throughout Europe. Principally, the French and Industrial
Revolutions ushered in a new era that was characterised economically by capitalism and capitalist imperialism and politically by the growth of the nation state (Hobsbawm, 2005) . The latter, as a matter of principle, mobilised citizens in pursuit of the former.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, France, the epicentre of the process of constructing the nation, led the way in mobilising the people to its cause. The French Revolution rested upon the idea that the state and the people had reciprocal rights and responsibilities. It is equally unsurprising that Britain maintained the use of mercenary forces much longer than France. After all, Britain had fought the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) precisely to contain the ideas of the French Revolution. Moreover, mercenary forces reinforced empire on the cheap. In India, for example, the East India Company maintained British control 3 and it was only after company rule was blamed for the uprising of 1857 that the British state took direct control of armed forces and 8 government of the sub-continent (Porter, 2004) . Indeed from the 1870s onwards, the Scramble for Africa (and, to a lesser extent, Asia) resulted in states taking formal imperial control of territories. Because of this, the extent to which mercenary forces could be successfully used was further delimited. And, by the time of the Great War (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) , the nature of warfare had changed to the point whereby mercenary forces became irrelevant. Total war and mass mobilisation necessitated that everyone in a nation be directly involved in the state's military objectives (Hobsbawm, 1998) .
As such, the declining role for private military forces, and the increase in state monopoly on military activity, was underpinned by a growing belief that the state should exercise control of violence. As Weber (1994) (Foucault, 2003: 267) 9
But it was not just politics that shaped the development of warfare and engagement in military activity. Increasingly, as the nineteenth century progressed and gave way to the twentieth, for the industrialising powers of Britain, Germany, France, Japan and the US, war became a tool via which to pursue capitalist and, as an intrinsic part of that, imperial goals. In this sense, and in keeping with the ideas of Hobsbawm (1968 Hobsbawm ( , 2007 (Harvey, 2003 (Harvey, , 2005 (Litvin, 2003; Klein, 2007) . Here, at the periphery, both formal and informal means were used to create circumstances favourable to neoliberal economics and to the expanding US economy more broadly. At the frontier, by preference, informal imperial tactics were employed to gain advantages for US capitalism. As we shall see later, from the 1990s onwards, such informal means were combined with the use of the re-emergent PSI.
By the late 1970s, however, neoliberal policies had sedimented within western capitalism itself as elites took advantage of high inflation and poor growth rates in order to smash Keynesianism. This process accelerated rapidly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most iconic reforms were those associated with privatisation, and these were certainly were crucial for the PSI. During the 1980s, policies of privatising nationalised industries, outsourcing the provision of services and greater public-private collaboration laid the foundations for its re-emergence. Explaining the changes that took place, Crouch (2012) focuses on the neoliberal influence on the organisational and managerial configuration of the state; arguing that governments sought 'to move their own activities closer to those of the private sector or even to move them fully into that sector' (p. 71). Importantly though this indexes a reconfiguration rather than the withering of the state, although the latter is often supposed by neoliberal theorists to be 12 a necessary outcome of their policies. Certainly with regard to the PSI we can see the reconfiguration of the state to better serve neoliberal capitalism through the removal of 'proper administrative oversight' (du Gay, 2002) . As such, neo-liberalism departs astonishingly from both the political and economic legacy of liberalism in not seeing any problem in a close relationship between firms and the state, provided the influence runs from firms to state
and not vice versa. The first error of this position is not to realize that firms try to influence the state precisely because they want that influence to turn back onto the economy, to grant them favours. (Crouch, 2012: 95) Although Crouch is discussing domestic affairs here, his point can be drawn out to elaborate on the conduct of private firms in the formal and informal empire.
Furthermore, the 'close relationship' he outlines seeks to excuse private organisations from public accountability, further demonstrating that neoliberalism is not libertarian in character but is rather concerned with liberating private organisations from the 'limitations' of accountability mechanisms.
In the UK context, from 1984 onwards the Thatcher government initiated a policy of especially extensive privatisation of many aspects of British industry and service provision. As such, it was here that the (re-)privatisation of the military began to take hold. Initially, a move toward the use of market mechanisms to determine whether military needs should be serviced 'in-house' or by the market saw the contracting out of provision like military housing and welfare services. However, before long, more and 13 more aspects of direct and indirect military support operations were opened up to free market tender -in-theatre supply chain management, maintenance and servicing of equipment, engineering services, intelligence and even military security. Similar events unfolded in other western states. Thus Kinsey (2006) argues that, by the early 2000s, western militaries had outsourced more or less every function other than combat itself.
Indeed, as Johnson (2004) and Krishnan (2008) both observe, the US and UK militaries have now become so dependent on contractors that they are unable to operate effectively without them.
But neoliberalism is both an economic project and an ideological one. The Cold War called for the projection and naturalisation of liberal economic policies in such a way as to not only promote them as good sense, but also to give these policies moral authority by linking them to notions of freedom, a connection pioneers Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1962) and then adapted for military use, often with the need for civilian operators (Coker, 1999; Kinsey, 2006; Hughes, 2007) . As such, by 2002, up to 80% of all British Army training involved civilian contractors of some kind and all Royal Navy shore-based training is now conducted in partnership with a commercial consortium -Flagship
Training Limited (Straw, 2002) . Hughes (2007) argues that this privatisation of military capability came most prominently to the fore in the aftermath of 9/11. The US government's instigation of a policy of 'Full Spectrum Dominance' (FSD) 5 necessitated increasing reliance on privately contracted organisations to achieve the goals that the recently downsized state military could no longer accomplish on its own. In a curious turn of events, here we see an increase in state powers that were subsequently delegated to the private sector. The result, according to Hughes, is the rise of what he calls a new 'security-industrial complex'; an industry ready-formed and able to offer a broad range of commercial solutions to problems of national and international security. This is a claim to which we shall return.
For now, however, the restructuring that occurred after 9/11 was also all of a piece with the 'best practice' ideologies which characterised neoliberal restructuring of other public and private sector organisations; namely downsize, outsource and/ or privatise. Indeed, Halliburton would perform duties ranging from high-risk chauffeuring to prisoner interrogation to catering to health care. (Klein, 2007: 285) These transformations were so controversial that eight retired generals called for his resignation, and he was eventually forced to step down in 2006 (Klein, 2007: 284) . However, Rumsfeld's attempt to bring outsourcing and downsizing to the heart of the US military had been successful.
These events, and the possibility of an emerging security-industrial complex, bring us back to the central question in this paper: namely, what are the implications of the changing relationship between public and private organisations over the control and conduct of military and security activity? In section 3 we address this by articulating some of the main uses of the PSI as a state tool. Specifically, we consider the use of private contractors as a neoliberal mechanism for expediting the transfer of territories in two specific ways: substituting for and supplementing state military and security activity.
Section 3: The PSI as a tool of neoliberal imperialism
Here we argue that, within neoliberal imperialism, the PSI has fundamentally assisted metropolitan states in moving imperial possessions from formal to informal control. It is 18 therefore worth outlining the concept of informal imperialism as originally suggested and developed by Gallagher and Robinson (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Robinson 1972 ). In the seminal paper 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', they define imperialism as the 'process of incorporating regions into the expanding economy ' (1953: 5) . This useful definition they augment with the idea that such an incorporation could be undertaken either through formal annexation or through informal control. It is the latter that interests us here.
Informal imperialism might be best characterised as the process of a state using collaborators at the periphery in order to secure economic advantage. Its principal advantage is that it is considerably cheaper than exerting formal control (annexation).
Parallels have been drawn between the attempts by Britain in the nineteenth century to establish a free trade empire and the attempts by the United States since the Second World War to establish a (neo)liberal empire (Kiely, 2011) . Both countries made use of informal imperialism and both countries sought to press informal empire through the weight of their dominant economies. In the nineteenth century, one of the most prominent examples of informal control was Britain's influence over Argentina, secured through the phenomenal investments the former made in the latter's railway infrastructure. This made the Argentinean government virtually dependent on the good will of British capitalism. In the twentieth century, as aforementioned, we have seen examples of US informal imperialism in countries such as Guatemala in the 1950s (Litvin, 2003) and Chile in the 1970s (Klein, 2007) . Moreover, as also implied earlier, Establishing informal empire rests upon the metropolitan power harnessing the power of pliable collaborator elites at the frontier. Neoliberal imperialism seeks to work much more quickly than British imperialism did in moving countries from formal to informal control. The sheer scale of US economic power makes this more feasible than it ever was for the British. In part, this is because the US has been able to use its considerable economic might to quickly overrun countries where previous collaboration has broken down -as it did in Grenada in 1983. In part, and building on military power, swift interventions followed by rapid privatisation of national assets and other structural changes to an area quickly befitted countries for informal control. However, as in the exemplary instance of Iraq, the quick switch from formal to informal leaves collaborators in a more exposed position than collaborators in the British empire, whose power was often built up over several decades.
The PSI provides an ideologically consistent way of bolstering the power of We return to all of these observations in section 4, but we will now outline the two functions we see the PSI fulfilling as a tool of informal imperialism: first, as a substitute for state military or security activity in situations where the state is unable or unwilling to act; second, and perhaps most prolifically, as a supplement to the state, through the subcontracting of military and security activity. (Smith, 2002: 108) . Executive
Outcomes combat forces also 'undertook commando assaults' (Singer, 2004: 108) against the rebel forces.
Supplementing the state
But in the past ten years or so, the more common utilisation of PSCs, and that which accounts for most of the PSI's growth, has been to supplement state military activity In each of these different forms, the PSI seems on the face of it to demonstrably undercut the control of legitimate violence by the state, something which Weber suggested a hundred years ago was -and importantly so -its unique role. Our thesis, however, is that the picture is a good deal more complex than this. In order to arrive at this conclusion, our next section argues that the employment of private security forces does not come without significant costs around accountability, regulation and oversight.
Section 4: Counting the costs of privatising war

The lack of accountability and its consequences
The widespread use of private contractors, we contend, not only complexifies the state control of legitimate violence but also poses questions about the management and conduct of military operations and around assigning accountability to those engaged in such activities. Contractors after all are civilians and therefore not subject to military command and control structures; nor are they subject to military law. Further, their status under civilian law is extremely ambiguous. We shall discuss PSI regulation and control shortly but, for now, it is worth observing that holding PSCs legally accountable for their actions, under civilian law, is extremely difficult for a number of reasons. In large part the lack of knowledge about the personnel involved in PSCs is a result of the lack of an audit trail and therefore individuals under suspicion will usually be removed from active service or reassigned before local law enforcement can act. This happened in 1999 when a number of DynCorp employees were reported to have sexually assaulted and raped women and young girls in Bosnia (Singer, 2004) . In other theatres of conflict, contractors have been afforded immunity from local civilian law.
Paul Bremer, shortly before handing over authority to the new Iraqi government, issued
Order 17, giving all coalition agents, including contractors, immunity from Iraqi law 'with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a In fact only one successful prosecution has been brought against a security contractor, and this was under the terms of the US Patriot Act, not local law. David Passaro, a former Green Beret, was charged in 2006 in relation to an Afghan detainee who died whilst being interrogated by US forces. However, Passaro was not charged with murder but instead sentenced to eight years for assault. In contrast, as Pelton Young (2007) observes, literally hundreds of US soldiers have been prosecuted, or court-martialled, in
Iraq for crimes ranging from theft to murder.
Second, part of the difficulty in identifying and holding accountable PSCs and their personnel stems from the (absence of) oversight arrangements in conflict zones. For example, in Iraq, oversight of PSC activity was itself outsourced to another PSC, Aegis
Ltd. Awarded the 'Matrix' contract by the US government, Aegis was responsible for monitoring the activities of PSCs and for coordinating activity between PSCs and the coalition forces (Armstrong, 2008) . This reliance on self-regulation again does not accord with the oversight procedures to which state security and military forces are subject.
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Third, one of the most complex issues surrounding the assignation of accountability results from the practice of sub-subcontracting by PSCs. Whilst the state may contract a well-known and established security firm, the relevant activities are then frequently subcontracted again to other PSCs. These, in turn, may subcontract further. What this means is that operators on the ground may well be far removed, geographically, legally, and even in terms of expected skills and experience, from the contracted PSC. As
McCoy (2010) (Armstrong, 2008: 203) This myriad of contracts not only confounds clear lines of accountability but also is arguably designed to protect the PSC from being accountable to its own employees.
Armstrong cites numerous compensation claims brought against PSCs by contractors
themselves, or the families of those killed, only to find that they do not have formal legal recourse due to the ambiguity of the original employment contract. The problem of legal status that this lack of accountability turns on leads us into our second 'cost', the absence of formal regulation and oversight.
The absence of formal regulation and oversight
Another hugely contentious issue surrounding the PSI centres on its very definition, or industry label, and therefore on the legislative architecture which applies. This complication arises because there is no universal agreement on whether contemporary private security companies constitute mercenary forces. As Krishnan (2008: 139) (Shearer, 1999) . Cleaver (2000) Congress or the American people (Chwastiak, 2007) . That a country's elected representatives are excluded from decisions about the engagement of forces deployed to further military objectives is worrying. This situation challenges the very basis of the US political system. In theory, wars can now be waged without public debate and without approval: decisions about the use of legitimate physical violence, on which the sovereign nation state was formed, are being removed from the democratic process.
Moreover, even when state military forces are employed, these can be supplemented by private contractors, enabling any enforced 'troop ceilings' to be overcome (Percy, 2006) . In Iraq, then, 150,000 US military personnel were 'supported' by over 125,000 private contractors. Never before, Broder and Risen (2007) note, has the US gone to war with so many civilians undertaking roles that would, in the past, have been fulfilled by uniformed labour.
The lack of either international or national regulation and consequent absence of clear oversight has raised many concerns for those critical of the use of privately contracted military and security forces. In the final section of our discussion we elaborate these concerns by arguing that the absence of meaningful accountability within the PSI may in part result from political, rather than economic, motives, such that the rewards of this dearth of transparency are reaped by specific elites at the heart of Hughes's (2007) security-industrial complex.
Section 5: The PSI, transparency and the security-industrial complex
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The absence of clear and robust forms of accountability, oversight and regulation makes it extremely difficult to grasp either the activities or the true scale of the PSI: there is a veil of secrecy around its activities that is only occasionally lifted through investigative journalism or the odd piece of empirical research. Indeed much PSI activity is exempt from Freedom of Information requests, and PSCs cannot be subpoenaed to appear before the US Congress (Chwastiak, 2007) . So there is a distinct lack of transparency in its workings, which in its turn allows the PSI to be utilised as a tool of informal neoliberal imperialism. This point can be directly connected to du Gay's (2000) warning of what happens when 'proper administrative oversight' is dismantled, in his argument against traditional critiques of bureaucracy. Du Gay contends that bureaucracy is neither just 'the iron cage' of rationality, nor an anonymous organisation full of faceless, amoral individuals. For our purposes here, we can understand bureaucracy as the legitimate articulation of state administrative procedures. So when du Gay expresses concern about the erosion of oversight in the name of neoliberal cutting of red tape, he is drawing our attention to the consequences. This is not a dewy-eyed view of bureaucracy as always providing for fairness and democracy, but it is to argue that bureaucracy is predicated on accountability. Given this, du Gay contends that the ethos of bureaucracy is a necessary feature of liberal democratic states. Similarly, we suggest that, as neoliberal states dispense with accountability as it pertains to a substantive proportion of their military activities, then these states become ever less answerable to the electorate; and perhaps even to elected politicians themselves.
As such, as the ethos of bureaucracy is excised from the exercise of informal empire and war via increasing use of the PSI, so are the constraints on the actions of those employed in military activities on behalf of the contracting state. Although in state militaries it may be more accurate to talk about the ethos as opposed to the practice of bureaucracy, we suggest that this ethos at least turns upon 'doing the right thing'. PSCs on the other hand seem to be driven by 'getting the job done' -whatever that may entail. What we see, therefore, in the downsizing, outsourcing and subcontracting of military activity ushered in most profoundly by Donald Rumsfeld post 2001 is a reduction in accountability based on the constitutional legitimacy that du Gay (2000) argues the bureaucratic ethos aims to uphold. In turn, this protects the interests of peripheral collaborators in informal empire, further facilitates the neoliberal political economy of metropolitan elites and threatens the proper administration of Weber's (1994) 'legitimate physical violence'.
Currently, lack of oversight and reporting hides the true costs of military activity.
Moreover, instead of the use of the PSI simply undermining the state control of
violence, rather what we are seeing is a 'new geography of security' (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011: 3) in which networks of social elites are converging on the control of security. And we are also witnessing the emergence of a new security-industrial complex that should be received with the same caution as that which Eisenhower sought to convey about a military-industrial complex in the 1960s. We elaborate on each of these observations below.
As we have noted earlier, numbers of security contractors and their activities are not officially recorded. This lack of reporting also extends to the death and injury count for conflicts not directly relevant to foreign policy objectives. But in the space between official policy like PDD 25 and the pursuit of neoliberal imperialism, the PSI arguably proves a most useful tool. That private security 'solutions' can be amassed quickly and without the need for oversight and approval (as we established earlier, in the US at least, if they cost less than $50 million) presumably makes them even more attractive. We would suggest that it is partly public hesitance and the cost in political capital of sending troops to fight which has led to an increasing reliance on the PSI by many nation states.
The increasing use of the PSI, the relative freedom under which the industry operates, (Armstrong, 2008; McCoy, 2010) .
Under Cheney's leadership, KBR were able to secure more than $2.3 billion in government, double what they earned in the previous five years. Moreover, they rose from 73 to 18 on the Pentagon's list of preferred contractors (Johnson, 2004 This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience ... In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist ... We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. (Eisenhower, 1961: 3) As Fallows (2002: 46) establishes, most historians suggest Eisenhower has been routinely misread as warning of 'an increased risk of going to war', whereas his real concerns were much more pragmatic and centred around the ways in which the military-39 industrial complex might coalesce to identify potential national security threats and demand a budget for weapon manufacturing on that basis. However, if we take it in the sense in which it was generally used during Vietnam, as Fallows also points out, the term 'military-industrial complex' is 'a shorthand reference to the interests that presumably kept profiting from the war' (ibid.).
Conclusion
Following Grey's (2009) call for further research at the boundary between the disciplines of security studies and organisation studies and by building on Banerjee's (2008) analysis of the PSI as an aspect of necrocapitalism, we have sought to introduce a new (/ old) industry to the discipline of management and organisation studies. We have located the industry in time and space and considered some of the main contours and characteristics of its current form. We conceive as a first tentative step into the substantive study of the PSI within our home discipline.
To summarise our key observations, the re-emergence of the market provision of military and security activity, combined with the specific way in which this activity is currently undertaken, has led many in disciplines such as politics and international relations, law and legal studies, history, and military and peace studies to call for greater scrutiny of what appears to be an emerging security-industrial complex. As McCoy notes, the increasing reliance on private military and security forces could potentially 'signal a net loss of control for most states under most circumstances ' (2010: 680) .
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However, utilised as a tool of informal neoliberal imperialism, we consider the relationship between state and private security contractor to be more complex than a simple transfer of power over the use of legitimate physical violence, identified by Weber (1994) as properly the sole province of the state. Following Abrahamsen and
Williams (2011) we suggest that the increasing use of private military and security contractors does not necessarily diminish the power of the state in relation to the use of legitimate physical violence. Instead the rise of the PSI is more closely linked to changes in the state whereby the lines of responsibility for, and control over, domestic and international security are beginning to blur. This is leading to 'new security structures and practices that are simultaneously public and private, global and local.
Within these assemblages, state power is certainly configured, but it is not necessarily weakened' (ibid.: 3).
And this is not just the story of the re-emergence of PSI in the current period. Our discussion highlights the organisational and managerial reconfiguration of the state, by analysing the way in which war has been privatised through the mechanism of informal empire -which relies on neoliberal, pro-free market logic. Privatisation of war, a logical consequence of neoliberal theory, also frees PSCs from the ethos of accountability and proper administrative oversight which du Gay (2000) 
